ICALEPCS2023 - Classification: General / Functional Safety/Protection Systems/Cyber Security

Paper	Title	Page
TU2BCO01	Database’s Disaster Recovery Meets a Ransomware Attack	280
	M.A. Zambrano SKAO, Macclesfield, United Kingdom V. Gonzalez ALMA Observatory, Santiago, Chile
	Cyberattacks are a growing threat to organizations around the world, including observatories. These attacks can cause significant disruption to operations and can be costly to recover from. This paper provides an overview of the history of cyberattacks, the motivations of attackers, and the organization of cybercrime groups. It also discusses the steps that can be taken to quickly restore a key component of any organization, the database, and the lessons learned during the recovery process. The paper concludes by identifying some areas for improvement in cybersecurity, such as the need for better training for employees, more secure networks, and more robust data backup and recovery procedures.
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO01
About •	Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 11 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 16 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023
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TU2BCO02	Protection Layers Design for the High Luminosity LHC Full Remote Alignment System	285
	B. Fernández Adiego, E. Blanco Viñuela, A. Germinario, H. Mainaud Durand, M. Sosin CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
	The Full Remote Alignment System (FRAS) is a complex measurement, alignment and control system designed to remotely align components of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) following its High Luminosity upgrade. The purpose of FRAS is to guarantee optimal alignment of the strong focusing magnets and associated components near the experimental interaction points, while at the same time limiting the radiation dose to which surveyors in the LHC tunnel are subjected. A failure in the FRAS control system, or an operator mistake, could provoke a non desired displacement of a component that could lead to damage of neighbouring equipment. Such an incident would incur a considerable repair cost both in terms of money and time. To mitigate this possibility, an exhaustive risk analysis of FRAS has been performed, with the design of protection layers according to the IEC 61511 standard proposed. This paper presents the different functional safety techniques applied to FRAS, reports on the current project status, and introduces the future activities to complete the safety life cycle.
	Slides TU2BCO02 [2.757 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO02
About •	Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 19 December 2023
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TU2BCO04	Accelerator Systems Cyber Security Activities at SLAC	292
	G.R. White, A.L. Edelen SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA
	Funding: Work supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract number DE-AC02-76SF00515. We describe four cyber security related activities of SLAC and collaborations. First, from a broad review of accelerator computing cyber and mission reliability, our analysis method, findings and outcomes. Second, lab-wide and accelerator penetration testing, in particular methods to control, coordinate, and trap, potentially hazardous scans. Third, a summary gap analysis of recent US regulatory orders from common practice at accelerators, and our plans to address these in collaboration with the US Dept. of Energy. Finally, summary attack vectors of EPICS, and technical plans to add authentication and encryption to EPICS itself.
	Slides TU2BCO04 [1.677 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO04
About •	Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 13 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 15 November 2023 — Issued ※ 17 December 2023
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TU2BCO06	Verification and Validation of the ESS Machine Protection System-of-Systems (MP-SoS)	296
	A. Nordt, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, J. Gustafsson, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, G.L. Ljungquist, S. Pavinato, A. Petrushenko ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source, ESS, is a source of spallation neutrons used for neutron scattering experiments, complementary to synchrotron light sources. ESS has very ambitious goals and experimentation with neutrons at ESS should be one or two orders of magnitude more performing compared to other sources. Each proton beam pulse generated by the linear accelerator will have a peak power of 125 MW. The machine’s equipment must be protected from damage due to beam losses, as such losses could lead to melting of e.g. the beam pipe within less than 5 microseconds. System-of-Systems engineering has been applied to deploy systematic and robust protection of the ESS machine. The ESS Machine Protection System of Systems (MP-SoS) consists of large-scale distributed systems, of which the components themselves are complex systems. Testing, verification and validation of the MP-SoS is rather challenging as each constituent system of the MP-SoS has its own management, functionality that is not necessarily designed for protection, and also the different system owners follow their own verification strategies. In this paper, we will present our experience gained through the first 3 beam commissioning phases, ESS has gone through so far. We will describe how we managed to declare MP-SoS to being ready for beam operation without complexifying the task, and we will present the challenges, issues, and lessons learned faced during the verification and validation campaigns.
	Slides TU2BCO06 [1.930 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO06
About •	Received ※ 31 October 2023 — Revised ※ 03 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 12 December 2023 — Issued ※ 20 December 2023
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TUMBCMO37	Personnel Safety Systems for ESS Beam on Dump and Beam on Target Operations	452
	M. Mansouri, A. Abujame, A. Andersson, M. Carroll, D. Daryadel, M. Eriksson, A. Farshidfar, R. Foroozan, V.A. Harahap, P. Holgersson, J. Lastow, G.L. Ljungquist, N. Naicker, A. Nordt, D. Paulic, A. Petrushenko, D.A. Plotnikov, Y. Takzare ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source (ESS) is a Pan-European project with 13 European nations as members, including the host nations Sweden and Denmark. ESS has been through staged installation and commissioning of the facility over the past few years. Along with the facility evolution, several Personnel Safety Systems, as key contributors to the overall personnel safety, have been developed and commissioned to support the safe operation of e.g. test stand for cryomodules Site Acceptance Test, test stand for Ion Source and Low Energy Beam Transport, and trial operation of the Normal Conducting Linac. As ESS is preparing for Beam on Dump (BoD) and Beam on Target (BoT) operations in coming years, PSS development is ongoing to enable safe commissioning and operation of the Linear Accelerator, Target Station, Bunker, and day-one Neutron Instruments. Personnel Safety Systems at ESS (ESS PSS) is an integrated system that is composed of several PSS systems across the facility. Following the experience gained from the earlier PSS built at ESS, modularized solutions have been adopted for ESS PSS that can adapt to the evolving needs of the facility from BoD and BoT operations to installing new Neutron Instruments during facility steady-state operation. This paper provides an overview of the ESS PSS, and its commissioning plan to support BoD and BoT operations.
	Slides TUMBCMO37 [1.135 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUMBCMO37
About •	Received ※ 07 October 2023 — Revised ※ 08 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 13 October 2023 — Issued ※ 23 October 2023
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TUPDP021	Machine Protection System Upgrade for a New Timing System at ELBE	542
	M. Justus, M. Kuntzsch, A. Schwarz, K. Zenker HZDR, Dresden, Germany L. Krmpotić, U. Legat, Ž. Oven, U. Rojec Cosylab, Ljubljana, Slovenia
	Running a CW electron accelerator as a user facility for more than two decades necessitates upgrades or even complete redesign of subsystems at some point. At ELBE, the outdated timing system needed a replacement due to obsolete components and functional limitations. Starting in 2019, with Cosylab as contractor and using hardware by Micro Research Finland, the new timing system has been developed and tested and is about to become operational. Besides the ability to generate a broader variety of beam patterns from single pulse mode to 26 MHz CW beams for the two electron sources, one of the benefits of the new system is improved machine safety. The ELBE control systems is mainly based on PLCs and industrial SCADA tools. This contribution depicts how the timing system implementation to the existing machine entailed extensions and modifications of the ELBE machine protection system, i.e. a new core MPS PLC, and how they are being realized.
	Poster TUPDP021 [0.731 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP021
About •	Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 08 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023
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TUPDP041	Safety System Final Design for the ITER Heating Neutral Beam Injector Test Bed	602
	A.F. Luchetta, M. Battistella, S. Dal Bello, L. Grando, M.M. Moressa Consorzio RFX, Padova, Italy J.M. Arias ITER Organization, St. Paul lez Durance, France C. Labate, F. Paolucci F4E, Barcelona, Spain
	Funding: This work has been carried out within the ITER-RFX Neutral Beam Test Facility (NBTF) Agreement and Fusion for Energy F4E-OFC-280 contract. MITICA, the prototype of the ITER heating neutral beam injector, will use an extensive computer-based safety system (MS) to provide occupational safety. The MS will integrate all personnel safety aspects. After a detailed risk analysis to identify the possible hazards and associated risks, we determined the safety instrumented functions (SIFs), needed to mitigate safety risks, and the associated Safety Integrity Levels (SIL), as prescribed in the IEC 61508 technical standard on functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. Finally, we verified the SIFs versus the required SIL. We identified 53 SIFs, 3 of which allocated to SIL2, 23 to SIL1, and the others without SIL. Based on the system analysis, we defined the MS architecture, also considering the following design criteria: - Using IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (Safety instrumented systems for the process industry) as guidelines; - Using system hardware to allow up to SIL3 SIFs; - Using certified software tools to allow programming up to SIL3 SIFs. The SIL3 requirement derives from the need to minimize the share of the hw/sw failure probability, thus allowing maximum share to sensors and actuators. The paper presents the requirements for the MITICA safety systems and the system design to meet them. Due to the required system reliability and availability, the hardware architecture is fully redundant. Given the requirement to choose proven solutions, the system implementation adopts industrial components.
	Poster TUPDP041 [2.498 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP041
About •	Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 08 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 22 December 2023
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TUPDP050	Development and Test Operation of the Prototype of the New Beam Interlock System for Machine Protection of the RIKEN RI Beam Factory	645
	M. Komiyama, M. Fujimaki, N. Fukunishi, A. Uchiyama RIKEN Nishina Center, Wako, Japan M. Hamanaka, K. Kaneko, R. Koyama, M. Nishimura, H. Yamauchi SHI Accelerator Service Ltd., Tokyo, Japan A. Kamoshida National Instruments Japan Corporation, MInato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
	We have been operating the beam interlock system (BIS) for machine protection of the RIKEN RI Beam Factory (RIBF) since 2006. It stops beams approximately 15 ms after receiving an alert signal from the accelerator and beam line components. We continue to operate BIS successfully; however, we are currently developing a successor system to stop a beam within 1 ms considering that the beam intensity of RIBF will continue to increase in the future. After comparing multiple systems, CompactRIO, a product by National Instruments, was selected for the successor system. Interlock logic for signal input/output is implemented on the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) because fast processing speed is required. On the other hand, signal condition setting and monitoring do not require the same speed as interlock logic. They are implemented on the RT-OS and controlled by using experimental physics and industrial control system (EPICS) by setting up an EPICS server on the RT-OS. As a first step in development, a prototype consisting of two stations that handle only digital alert signals was developed and installed in part of the RIBF in the summer of 2022 (224 input contacts). The signal response time of the prototype, measured with an oscilloscope, averaged 0.52 ms with both stations (the distance between two stations is approximately 75 m). Furthermore, by additionally installing a pull-up circuit at each signal input contact of the system, the system response time was successfully reduced to approximately 0.13 ms.
	Poster TUPDP050 [0.816 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP050
About •	Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023
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TUPDP078	Management of Configuration for Protection Systems at ESS	695
	M. Carroll, G.L. Ljungquist, M. Mansouri, A. Nordt, D. Paulic ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source (ESS) in Sweden is one of the largest science and technology infrastructure projects being built today. The facility design and construction include the most powerful linear proton accelerator ever built, a five-tonne, helium-cooled tungsten target wheel and 22 state-of-the-art neutron instruments. The Protection Systems Group (PSG) at ESS are responsible for the delivery and management of all the Personnel Safety Systems (PSS) and Machine Protection Systems (MPS), consisting of up to 30 PSS control systems and 6 machine protection systems. Due to the bespoke and evolving nature of the facility, managing the configuration of all these systems poses a significant challenge for the team. This paper will describe the methodology followed to ensure that the correct configuration is correctly implemented and maintained throughout the full engineering lifecycle for these systems.
	Poster TUPDP078 [1.216 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP078
About •	Received ※ 06 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 13 October 2023 — Issued ※ 26 October 2023
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TUPDP081	The ESS Fast Beam Interlock System - Design, Deployment and Commissioning of the Normal Conducting Linac	704
	S. Pavinato, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, A.A. Gorzawski, A. Nordt ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source (ESS) is a research facility based in Lund, Sweden. Its linac will have an high peak current of 62.5 mA and long pulse length of 2.86 ms with a repetition rate of 14 Hz. The Fast Beam Interlock System (FBIS), as core system of the Beam Interlock System at ESS, is a critical system for ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the ESS machine. It is a modular and distributed system. FBIS will collect data from all relevant accelerator and target systems through ~300 direct inputs and decides whether beam operation can start or must stop. The FBIS operates at high data speed and requires low-latency decision-making capability to avoid introducing delays and to ensure the protection of the accelerator. This is achieved through two main hardware blocks equipped with FPGA based boards: a mTCA ’Decision Logic Node’ (DLN), executing the protection logic and realizing interfaces to Higher-Level Safety, Timing and EPICS Control Systems. The second block, a cPCI form-factor ’Signal Condition Unit’ (SCU), implements the interface between FBIS inputs/outputs and DLNs. In this paper we present the implementation of the FBIS control system, the integration of different hardware and software components and a summary on its performance during the latest beam commissioning phase to DTL4 Faraday Cup in 2023.
	Poster TUPDP081 [2.284 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP081
About •	Received ※ 26 September 2023 — Accepted ※ 11 December 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023
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TUPDP082	Target Safety System Maintenance	709
	A. Sadeghzadeh, L. Coney, O. Ingemansson, O.J. Janson, M. Olsson ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The Target Safety System (TSS) is part of the overall radiation safety plan for the Target Station in the European Spallation Source (ESS). ESS, Target Division, Target Controls and Safety group is responsible for the design and construction of the TSS. TSS stops Proton production if vital process conditions measured at the Target Station, are outside the set boundaries with the potential of causing (radiation) injury to third parties (public outside ESS fences). The TSS is a 3-channel fail-safe safety system consisting of independent sensors, a two redundant train system based on relay and safety PLC technique and independent ways of stopping the proton beam accelerator. TSS will continuously monitor safety parameters in the target He cooling, wheel, and monolith atmosphere systems, evaluate their conditions, and turn off the proton beam if necessary. After passing several stages of off-site test, the TSS cabinets are now installed on site and successfully passed internal integration. In this paper we will explain features we fit into the system to ease emergency repairs, system modification and system safety verification and in general maintainability of the system.
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP082
About •	Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 10 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023
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TUPDP096	Early Fire Detection in High Power Equipment	775
	S. Pavis, E. Carlier, C.A. Lolliot, N. Magnin CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
	Very early fire detection in equipment cabinets containing high power supply sources and power electronic switching devices is needed when building and tunnel fire detection systems may not be well placed to detect a fire until it is well established. Highly sensitive aspirating smoke detection systems which continuously sample the air quality inside equipment racks and give local power interlock in the event of smoke detection, are capable of cutting the source of power to these circuits at a very early stage, thereby preventing fires before they become fully established. Sampling pipework can also be routed to specific locations within the cabinet for more zone focused monitoring, while the electronic part of the detection system is located externally of the cabinet for easy operation and maintenance. Several of these early fire detection systems have recently been installed in LHC and SPS accelerator kicker installations, with many more planned. This paper compares the detection technology from typical manufacturers, presents the approach adopted and its mechanical installation and discusses the integration within different control architecture.
	Poster TUPDP096 [1.139 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP096
About •	Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 05 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023
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TUPDP103	Interlock Super Agent : Enhancing Machine Efficiency and Performance at CERN’s Super Proton Synchrotron	799
	E. Veyrunes, A. Asko, G. Trad, J. Wenninger CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
	In the CERN Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS), finding the source of an interlock signal has become increasingly unmanageable due to the complex interdependencies between the agents in both the beam interlock system (BIS) and the software interlock system (SIS). This often leads to delays, with the inefficiency in diagnosing beam stops impacting the overall performance of the accelerator. The Interlock Super Agent (ISA) was introduced to address this challenge. It traces the interlocks responsible for beam stops, regardless of whether they originated in BIS or SIS. By providing a better understanding of interdependencies, ISA significantly improves machine efficiency by reducing time for diagnosis and by documenting such events through platforms such as the Accelerator Fault Tracking system. The paper will discuss the practical implementation of ISA and its potential application throughout the CERN accelerator complex.
	Poster TUPDP103 [4.719 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP103
About •	Received ※ 25 September 2023 — Revised ※ 11 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 05 December 2023 — Issued ※ 13 December 2023
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TUPDP111	Software and Firmware-Logic Design for the PIP-II Machine Protection System Mode and Configuration Control at Fermilab	832
	L.R. Carmichael, M.R. Austin, E.R. Harms, R. Neswold, A. Prosser, A. Warner, J.Y. Wu Fermilab, Batavia, Illinois, USA
	Funding: This manuscript has been authored by Fermi Research Alliance, LLC under Contract No. DE-AC02-07CH11359 with the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of High Energy Physics The PIP-II Machine Protection System (MPS) requires a dedicated set of tools for configuration control and management of the machine modes and beam modes of the accelerator. The protection system reacts to signals from various elements of the machine according to rules established in a setup database filtered by the program Mode Controller. This is achieved in accordance with commands from the operator and governed by the firmware logic of the MPS. This paper describes the firmware logic, architecture, and implementation of the program mode controller in an EPICs based environment.
	Poster TUPDP111 [2.313 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP111
About •	Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 04 December 2023 — Issued ※ 12 December 2023
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TUPDP125	Design and Implementation the LCLS-II Machine Protection System	877
	J.A. Mock, Z.A. Domke, R.T. Herbst, P. Krejcik, R. Ruckman, L. Sapozhnikov SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA
	The linear accelerator complex at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory has been upgraded to include LCLS-II, a new linac capable of producing beam power as high as several hundred kW with CW beam rates up to 1 MHz while maintaining existing capabilities from the copper machine. Because of these high-power beams, a new Machine Protection System with a latency of less than 100 us was designed and installed to prevent damage to the machine when a fault or beam loss is detected. The new LCLS-II MPS must work in parallel with the existing MPS from the respective sources all the way through the user hutches to provide a mechanism to reduce the beam rate or shut down operation in a beamline without impacting the neighboring beamline when a fault condition is detected. Because either beamline can use either accelerator as its source and each accelerator has different operating requirements, great care was taken in the overall system design to ensure the necessary operation can be achieved with a seamless experience for the accelerator operators. The overall system design of the LCLS-II MPS software including the ability to interact with the existing systems and the tools developed for the control room to provide the user operation experience will be described.
	Poster TUPDP125 [1.360 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP125
About •	Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 30 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 04 December 2023 — Issued ※ 14 December 2023
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TUPDP129	The LCLS-II Experiment Controls Preemptive Machine Protection System	886
	T.A. Wallace SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA
	Funding: This work is supported by Department of Energy contract DE-AC02-76SF00515. The LCLS-II Preemptive Machine Protection System (PMPS) safeguards diagnostics, optics, beam-shaping components and experiment apparatus from damage by excess XFEL average power and single-shots. The dynamic nature of these systems requires a somewhat novel approach to a machine protection system design, relying more heavily on preemptive interlocks and automation to avoid mismatches between device states and beam parameters. This is in contrast to reactive machine protection systems. Safe beam parameter sets are determined from the combination of all integrated devices using a hierarchical arrangement and all state changes are held until beam conditions are assured to be safe. This machine protection system design utilizes the Beckhoff industrial controls platform and EtherCAT, and is woven into the LCLS subsystem controllers as a code library and standardized hardware interface.
	Poster TUPDP129 [1.146 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP129
About •	Received ※ 25 October 2023 — Revised ※ 01 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 30 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023
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Paper

Title

Page

Database’s Disaster Recovery Meets a Ransomware Attack

280

M.A. Zambrano
SKAO, Macclesfield, United Kingdom
V. Gonzalez
ALMA Observatory, Santiago, Chile

Cyberattacks are a growing threat to organizations around the world, including observatories. These attacks can cause significant disruption to operations and can be costly to recover from. This paper provides an overview of the history of cyberattacks, the motivations of attackers, and the organization of cybercrime groups. It also discusses the steps that can be taken to quickly restore a key component of any organization, the database, and the lessons learned during the recovery process. The paper concludes by identifying some areas for improvement in cybersecurity, such as the need for better training for employees, more secure networks, and more robust data backup and recovery procedures.

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO01

About •

Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 11 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 16 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO02

Protection Layers Design for the High Luminosity LHC Full Remote Alignment System

285

B. Fernández Adiego, E. Blanco Viñuela, A. Germinario, H. Mainaud Durand, M. Sosin
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland

The Full Remote Alignment System (FRAS) is a complex measurement, alignment and control system designed to remotely align components of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) following its High Luminosity upgrade. The purpose of FRAS is to guarantee optimal alignment of the strong focusing magnets and associated components near the experimental interaction points, while at the same time limiting the radiation dose to which surveyors in the LHC tunnel are subjected. A failure in the FRAS control system, or an operator mistake, could provoke a non desired displacement of a component that could lead to damage of neighbouring equipment. Such an incident would incur a considerable repair cost both in terms of money and time. To mitigate this possibility, an exhaustive risk analysis of FRAS has been performed, with the design of protection layers according to the IEC 61511 standard proposed. This paper presents the different functional safety techniques applied to FRAS, reports on the current project status, and introduces the future activities to complete the safety life cycle.

Slides TU2BCO02 [2.757 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO02

About •

Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 19 December 2023

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TU2BCO04

Accelerator Systems Cyber Security Activities at SLAC

292

G.R. White, A.L. Edelen
SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA

Funding: Work supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract number DE-AC02-76SF00515.
We describe four cyber security related activities of SLAC and collaborations. First, from a broad review of accelerator computing cyber and mission reliability, our analysis method, findings and outcomes. Second, lab-wide and accelerator penetration testing, in particular methods to control, coordinate, and trap, potentially hazardous scans. Third, a summary gap analysis of recent US regulatory orders from common practice at accelerators, and our plans to address these in collaboration with the US Dept. of Energy. Finally, summary attack vectors of EPICS, and technical plans to add authentication and encryption to EPICS itself.

Slides TU2BCO04 [1.677 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO04

About •

Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 13 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 15 November 2023 — Issued ※ 17 December 2023

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reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO06

Verification and Validation of the ESS Machine Protection System-of-Systems (MP-SoS)

296

A. Nordt, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, J. Gustafsson, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, G.L. Ljungquist, S. Pavinato, A. Petrushenko
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source, ESS, is a source of spallation neutrons used for neutron scattering experiments, complementary to synchrotron light sources. ESS has very ambitious goals and experimentation with neutrons at ESS should be one or two orders of magnitude more performing compared to other sources. Each proton beam pulse generated by the linear accelerator will have a peak power of 125 MW. The machine’s equipment must be protected from damage due to beam losses, as such losses could lead to melting of e.g. the beam pipe within less than 5 microseconds. System-of-Systems engineering has been applied to deploy systematic and robust protection of the ESS machine. The ESS Machine Protection System of Systems (MP-SoS) consists of large-scale distributed systems, of which the components themselves are complex systems. Testing, verification and validation of the MP-SoS is rather challenging as each constituent system of the MP-SoS has its own management, functionality that is not necessarily designed for protection, and also the different system owners follow their own verification strategies. In this paper, we will present our experience gained through the first 3 beam commissioning phases, ESS has gone through so far. We will describe how we managed to declare MP-SoS to being ready for beam operation without complexifying the task, and we will present the challenges, issues, and lessons learned faced during the verification and validation campaigns.

Slides TU2BCO06 [1.930 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO06

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Received ※ 31 October 2023 — Revised ※ 03 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 12 December 2023 — Issued ※ 20 December 2023

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TUMBCMO37

Personnel Safety Systems for ESS Beam on Dump and Beam on Target Operations

452

M. Mansouri, A. Abujame, A. Andersson, M. Carroll, D. Daryadel, M. Eriksson, A. Farshidfar, R. Foroozan, V.A. Harahap, P. Holgersson, J. Lastow, G.L. Ljungquist, N. Naicker, A. Nordt, D. Paulic, A. Petrushenko, D.A. Plotnikov, Y. Takzare
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source (ESS) is a Pan-European project with 13 European nations as members, including the host nations Sweden and Denmark. ESS has been through staged installation and commissioning of the facility over the past few years. Along with the facility evolution, several Personnel Safety Systems, as key contributors to the overall personnel safety, have been developed and commissioned to support the safe operation of e.g. test stand for cryomodules Site Acceptance Test, test stand for Ion Source and Low Energy Beam Transport, and trial operation of the Normal Conducting Linac. As ESS is preparing for Beam on Dump (BoD) and Beam on Target (BoT) operations in coming years, PSS development is ongoing to enable safe commissioning and operation of the Linear Accelerator, Target Station, Bunker, and day-one Neutron Instruments. Personnel Safety Systems at ESS (ESS PSS) is an integrated system that is composed of several PSS systems across the facility. Following the experience gained from the earlier PSS built at ESS, modularized solutions have been adopted for ESS PSS that can adapt to the evolving needs of the facility from BoD and BoT operations to installing new Neutron Instruments during facility steady-state operation. This paper provides an overview of the ESS PSS, and its commissioning plan to support BoD and BoT operations.

Slides TUMBCMO37 [1.135 MB]

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reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUMBCMO37

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Received ※ 07 October 2023 — Revised ※ 08 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 13 October 2023 — Issued ※ 23 October 2023

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TUPDP021

Machine Protection System Upgrade for a New Timing System at ELBE

542

M. Justus, M. Kuntzsch, A. Schwarz, K. Zenker
HZDR, Dresden, Germany
L. Krmpotić, U. Legat, Ž. Oven, U. Rojec
Cosylab, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Running a CW electron accelerator as a user facility for more than two decades necessitates upgrades or even complete redesign of subsystems at some point. At ELBE, the outdated timing system needed a replacement due to obsolete components and functional limitations. Starting in 2019, with Cosylab as contractor and using hardware by Micro Research Finland, the new timing system has been developed and tested and is about to become operational. Besides the ability to generate a broader variety of beam patterns from single pulse mode to 26 MHz CW beams for the two electron sources, one of the benefits of the new system is improved machine safety. The ELBE control systems is mainly based on PLCs and industrial SCADA tools. This contribution depicts how the timing system implementation to the existing machine entailed extensions and modifications of the ELBE machine protection system, i.e. a new core MPS PLC, and how they are being realized.

Poster TUPDP021 [0.731 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP021

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Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 08 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023

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TUPDP041

Safety System Final Design for the ITER Heating Neutral Beam Injector Test Bed

602

A.F. Luchetta, M. Battistella, S. Dal Bello, L. Grando, M.M. Moressa
Consorzio RFX, Padova, Italy
J.M. Arias
ITER Organization, St. Paul lez Durance, France
C. Labate, F. Paolucci
F4E, Barcelona, Spain

Funding: This work has been carried out within the ITER-RFX Neutral Beam Test Facility (NBTF) Agreement and Fusion for Energy F4E-OFC-280 contract.
MITICA, the prototype of the ITER heating neutral beam injector, will use an extensive computer-based safety system (MS) to provide occupational safety. The MS will integrate all personnel safety aspects. After a detailed risk analysis to identify the possible hazards and associated risks, we determined the safety instrumented functions (SIFs), needed to mitigate safety risks, and the associated Safety Integrity Levels (SIL), as prescribed in the IEC 61508 technical standard on functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. Finally, we verified the SIFs versus the required SIL. We identified 53 SIFs, 3 of which allocated to SIL2, 23 to SIL1, and the others without SIL. Based on the system analysis, we defined the MS architecture, also considering the following design criteria: - Using IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (Safety instrumented systems for the process industry) as guidelines; - Using system hardware to allow up to SIL3 SIFs; - Using certified software tools to allow programming up to SIL3 SIFs. The SIL3 requirement derives from the need to minimize the share of the hw/sw failure probability, thus allowing maximum share to sensors and actuators. The paper presents the requirements for the MITICA safety systems and the system design to meet them. Due to the required system reliability and availability, the hardware architecture is fully redundant. Given the requirement to choose proven solutions, the system implementation adopts industrial components.

Poster TUPDP041 [2.498 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP041

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Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 08 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 22 December 2023

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TUPDP050

Development and Test Operation of the Prototype of the New Beam Interlock System for Machine Protection of the RIKEN RI Beam Factory

645

M. Komiyama, M. Fujimaki, N. Fukunishi, A. Uchiyama
RIKEN Nishina Center, Wako, Japan
M. Hamanaka, K. Kaneko, R. Koyama, M. Nishimura, H. Yamauchi
SHI Accelerator Service Ltd., Tokyo, Japan
A. Kamoshida
National Instruments Japan Corporation, MInato-ku, Tokyo, Japan

We have been operating the beam interlock system (BIS) for machine protection of the RIKEN RI Beam Factory (RIBF) since 2006. It stops beams approximately 15 ms after receiving an alert signal from the accelerator and beam line components. We continue to operate BIS successfully; however, we are currently developing a successor system to stop a beam within 1 ms considering that the beam intensity of RIBF will continue to increase in the future. After comparing multiple systems, CompactRIO, a product by National Instruments, was selected for the successor system. Interlock logic for signal input/output is implemented on the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) because fast processing speed is required. On the other hand, signal condition setting and monitoring do not require the same speed as interlock logic. They are implemented on the RT-OS and controlled by using experimental physics and industrial control system (EPICS) by setting up an EPICS server on the RT-OS. As a first step in development, a prototype consisting of two stations that handle only digital alert signals was developed and installed in part of the RIBF in the summer of 2022 (224 input contacts). The signal response time of the prototype, measured with an oscilloscope, averaged 0.52 ms with both stations (the distance between two stations is approximately 75 m). Furthermore, by additionally installing a pull-up circuit at each signal input contact of the system, the system response time was successfully reduced to approximately 0.13 ms.

Poster TUPDP050 [0.816 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP050

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Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023

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TUPDP078

Management of Configuration for Protection Systems at ESS

695

M. Carroll, G.L. Ljungquist, M. Mansouri, A. Nordt, D. Paulic
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source (ESS) in Sweden is one of the largest science and technology infrastructure projects being built today. The facility design and construction include the most powerful linear proton accelerator ever built, a five-tonne, helium-cooled tungsten target wheel and 22 state-of-the-art neutron instruments. The Protection Systems Group (PSG) at ESS are responsible for the delivery and management of all the Personnel Safety Systems (PSS) and Machine Protection Systems (MPS), consisting of up to 30 PSS control systems and 6 machine protection systems. Due to the bespoke and evolving nature of the facility, managing the configuration of all these systems poses a significant challenge for the team. This paper will describe the methodology followed to ensure that the correct configuration is correctly implemented and maintained throughout the full engineering lifecycle for these systems.

Poster TUPDP078 [1.216 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP078

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Received ※ 06 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 13 October 2023 — Issued ※ 26 October 2023

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TUPDP081

The ESS Fast Beam Interlock System - Design, Deployment and Commissioning of the Normal Conducting Linac

704

S. Pavinato, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, A.A. Gorzawski, A. Nordt
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source (ESS) is a research facility based in Lund, Sweden. Its linac will have an high peak current of 62.5 mA and long pulse length of 2.86 ms with a repetition rate of 14 Hz. The Fast Beam Interlock System (FBIS), as core system of the Beam Interlock System at ESS, is a critical system for ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the ESS machine. It is a modular and distributed system. FBIS will collect data from all relevant accelerator and target systems through ~300 direct inputs and decides whether beam operation can start or must stop. The FBIS operates at high data speed and requires low-latency decision-making capability to avoid introducing delays and to ensure the protection of the accelerator. This is achieved through two main hardware blocks equipped with FPGA based boards: a mTCA ’Decision Logic Node’ (DLN), executing the protection logic and realizing interfaces to Higher-Level Safety, Timing and EPICS Control Systems. The second block, a cPCI form-factor ’Signal Condition Unit’ (SCU), implements the interface between FBIS inputs/outputs and DLNs. In this paper we present the implementation of the FBIS control system, the integration of different hardware and software components and a summary on its performance during the latest beam commissioning phase to DTL4 Faraday Cup in 2023.

Poster TUPDP081 [2.284 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP081

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Received ※ 26 September 2023 — Accepted ※ 11 December 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023

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TUPDP082

Target Safety System Maintenance

709

A. Sadeghzadeh, L. Coney, O. Ingemansson, O.J. Janson, M. Olsson
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The Target Safety System (TSS) is part of the overall radiation safety plan for the Target Station in the European Spallation Source (ESS). ESS, Target Division, Target Controls and Safety group is responsible for the design and construction of the TSS. TSS stops Proton production if vital process conditions measured at the Target Station, are outside the set boundaries with the potential of causing (radiation) injury to third parties (public outside ESS fences). The TSS is a 3-channel fail-safe safety system consisting of independent sensors, a two redundant train system based on relay and safety PLC technique and independent ways of stopping the proton beam accelerator. TSS will continuously monitor safety parameters in the target He cooling, wheel, and monolith atmosphere systems, evaluate their conditions, and turn off the proton beam if necessary. After passing several stages of off-site test, the TSS cabinets are now installed on site and successfully passed internal integration. In this paper we will explain features we fit into the system to ease emergency repairs, system modification and system safety verification and in general maintainability of the system.

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP082

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Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 10 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023

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TUPDP096

Early Fire Detection in High Power Equipment

775

S. Pavis, E. Carlier, C.A. Lolliot, N. Magnin
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland

Very early fire detection in equipment cabinets containing high power supply sources and power electronic switching devices is needed when building and tunnel fire detection systems may not be well placed to detect a fire until it is well established. Highly sensitive aspirating smoke detection systems which continuously sample the air quality inside equipment racks and give local power interlock in the event of smoke detection, are capable of cutting the source of power to these circuits at a very early stage, thereby preventing fires before they become fully established. Sampling pipework can also be routed to specific locations within the cabinet for more zone focused monitoring, while the electronic part of the detection system is located externally of the cabinet for easy operation and maintenance. Several of these early fire detection systems have recently been installed in LHC and SPS accelerator kicker installations, with many more planned. This paper compares the detection technology from typical manufacturers, presents the approach adopted and its mechanical installation and discusses the integration within different control architecture.

Poster TUPDP096 [1.139 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP096

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Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 05 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023

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TUPDP103

Interlock Super Agent : Enhancing Machine Efficiency and Performance at CERN’s Super Proton Synchrotron

799

E. Veyrunes, A. Asko, G. Trad, J. Wenninger
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland

In the CERN Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS), finding the source of an interlock signal has become increasingly unmanageable due to the complex interdependencies between the agents in both the beam interlock system (BIS) and the software interlock system (SIS). This often leads to delays, with the inefficiency in diagnosing beam stops impacting the overall performance of the accelerator. The Interlock Super Agent (ISA) was introduced to address this challenge. It traces the interlocks responsible for beam stops, regardless of whether they originated in BIS or SIS. By providing a better understanding of interdependencies, ISA significantly improves machine efficiency by reducing time for diagnosis and by documenting such events through platforms such as the Accelerator Fault Tracking system. The paper will discuss the practical implementation of ISA and its potential application throughout the CERN accelerator complex.

Poster TUPDP103 [4.719 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP103

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Received ※ 25 September 2023 — Revised ※ 11 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 05 December 2023 — Issued ※ 13 December 2023

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TUPDP111

Software and Firmware-Logic Design for the PIP-II Machine Protection System Mode and Configuration Control at Fermilab

832

L.R. Carmichael, M.R. Austin, E.R. Harms, R. Neswold, A. Prosser, A. Warner, J.Y. Wu
Fermilab, Batavia, Illinois, USA

Funding: This manuscript has been authored by Fermi Research Alliance, LLC under Contract No. DE-AC02-07CH11359 with the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of High Energy Physics
The PIP-II Machine Protection System (MPS) requires a dedicated set of tools for configuration control and management of the machine modes and beam modes of the accelerator. The protection system reacts to signals from various elements of the machine according to rules established in a setup database filtered by the program Mode Controller. This is achieved in accordance with commands from the operator and governed by the firmware logic of the MPS. This paper describes the firmware logic, architecture, and implementation of the program mode controller in an EPICs based environment.

Poster TUPDP111 [2.313 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP111

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Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 04 December 2023 — Issued ※ 12 December 2023

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TUPDP125

Design and Implementation the LCLS-II Machine Protection System

877

J.A. Mock, Z.A. Domke, R.T. Herbst, P. Krejcik, R. Ruckman, L. Sapozhnikov
SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA

The linear accelerator complex at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory has been upgraded to include LCLS-II, a new linac capable of producing beam power as high as several hundred kW with CW beam rates up to 1 MHz while maintaining existing capabilities from the copper machine. Because of these high-power beams, a new Machine Protection System with a latency of less than 100 us was designed and installed to prevent damage to the machine when a fault or beam loss is detected. The new LCLS-II MPS must work in parallel with the existing MPS from the respective sources all the way through the user hutches to provide a mechanism to reduce the beam rate or shut down operation in a beamline without impacting the neighboring beamline when a fault condition is detected. Because either beamline can use either accelerator as its source and each accelerator has different operating requirements, great care was taken in the overall system design to ensure the necessary operation can be achieved with a seamless experience for the accelerator operators. The overall system design of the LCLS-II MPS software including the ability to interact with the existing systems and the tools developed for the control room to provide the user operation experience will be described.

Poster TUPDP125 [1.360 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP125

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Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 30 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 04 December 2023 — Issued ※ 14 December 2023

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TUPDP129

The LCLS-II Experiment Controls Preemptive Machine Protection System

886

T.A. Wallace
SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA

Funding: This work is supported by Department of Energy contract DE-AC02-76SF00515.
The LCLS-II Preemptive Machine Protection System (PMPS) safeguards diagnostics, optics, beam-shaping components and experiment apparatus from damage by excess XFEL average power and single-shots. The dynamic nature of these systems requires a somewhat novel approach to a machine protection system design, relying more heavily on preemptive interlocks and automation to avoid mismatches between device states and beam parameters. This is in contrast to reactive machine protection systems. Safe beam parameter sets are determined from the combination of all integrated devices using a hierarchical arrangement and all state changes are held until beam conditions are assured to be safe. This machine protection system design utilizes the Beckhoff industrial controls platform and EtherCAT, and is woven into the LCLS subsystem controllers as a code library and standardized hardware interface.

Poster TUPDP129 [1.146 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP129

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Received ※ 25 October 2023 — Revised ※ 01 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 30 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023

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