ICALEPCS2023 - List of Keywords (machine-protect)

Paper	Title	Other Keywords	Page
TU2BCO06	Verification and Validation of the ESS Machine Protection System-of-Systems (MP-SoS)	hardware, operation, interface, software	296
	A. Nordt, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, J. Gustafsson, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, G.L. Ljungquist, S. Pavinato, A. Petrushenko ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source, ESS, is a source of spallation neutrons used for neutron scattering experiments, complementary to synchrotron light sources. ESS has very ambitious goals and experimentation with neutrons at ESS should be one or two orders of magnitude more performing compared to other sources. Each proton beam pulse generated by the linear accelerator will have a peak power of 125 MW. The machine’s equipment must be protected from damage due to beam losses, as such losses could lead to melting of e.g. the beam pipe within less than 5 microseconds. System-of-Systems engineering has been applied to deploy systematic and robust protection of the ESS machine. The ESS Machine Protection System of Systems (MP-SoS) consists of large-scale distributed systems, of which the components themselves are complex systems. Testing, verification and validation of the MP-SoS is rather challenging as each constituent system of the MP-SoS has its own management, functionality that is not necessarily designed for protection, and also the different system owners follow their own verification strategies. In this paper, we will present our experience gained through the first 3 beam commissioning phases, ESS has gone through so far. We will describe how we managed to declare MP-SoS to being ready for beam operation without complexifying the task, and we will present the challenges, issues, and lessons learned faced during the verification and validation campaigns.
	Slides TU2BCO06 [1.930 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO06
About •	Received ※ 31 October 2023 — Revised ※ 03 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 12 December 2023 — Issued ※ 20 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TUPDP078	Management of Configuration for Protection Systems at ESS	controls, interface, operation, PLC	695
	M. Carroll, G.L. Ljungquist, M. Mansouri, A. Nordt, D. Paulic ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source (ESS) in Sweden is one of the largest science and technology infrastructure projects being built today. The facility design and construction include the most powerful linear proton accelerator ever built, a five-tonne, helium-cooled tungsten target wheel and 22 state-of-the-art neutron instruments. The Protection Systems Group (PSG) at ESS are responsible for the delivery and management of all the Personnel Safety Systems (PSS) and Machine Protection Systems (MPS), consisting of up to 30 PSS control systems and 6 machine protection systems. Due to the bespoke and evolving nature of the facility, managing the configuration of all these systems poses a significant challenge for the team. This paper will describe the methodology followed to ensure that the correct configuration is correctly implemented and maintained throughout the full engineering lifecycle for these systems.
	Poster TUPDP078 [1.216 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP078
About •	Received ※ 06 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 13 October 2023 — Issued ※ 26 October 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TUPDP129	The LCLS-II Experiment Controls Preemptive Machine Protection System	PLC, controls, interface, diagnostics	886
	T.A. Wallace SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA
	Funding: This work is supported by Department of Energy contract DE-AC02-76SF00515. The LCLS-II Preemptive Machine Protection System (PMPS) safeguards diagnostics, optics, beam-shaping components and experiment apparatus from damage by excess XFEL average power and single-shots. The dynamic nature of these systems requires a somewhat novel approach to a machine protection system design, relying more heavily on preemptive interlocks and automation to avoid mismatches between device states and beam parameters. This is in contrast to reactive machine protection systems. Safe beam parameter sets are determined from the combination of all integrated devices using a hierarchical arrangement and all state changes are held until beam conditions are assured to be safe. This machine protection system design utilizes the Beckhoff industrial controls platform and EtherCAT, and is woven into the LCLS subsystem controllers as a code library and standardized hardware interface.
	Poster TUPDP129 [1.146 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP129
About •	Received ※ 25 October 2023 — Revised ※ 01 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 30 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

THPDP102	Machine Protection System at SARAF	PLC, controls, detector, hardware	1573
	A. Gaget, J. Dumas CEA-IRFU, Gif-sur-Yvette, France A. Chancé, F. Gougnaud, T.J. Joannem, A. Lotode, S. Monnereau, V. Nadot CEA-DRF-IRFU, France H. Isakov, A. Perry, E. Reinfeld, I. Shmuely, N. Tamim, L. Weissman Soreq NRC, Yavne, Israel
	CEA Saclay Irfu is in charge of the major part of the control system of the SARAF-LINAC accelerator based at Soreq in Israel. This scope also includes the Machine Protection System. This system prevents any damage in the accelerator by shutting down the beam in case of detection of risky incidents like interceptive diagnostics in the beam or vacuum or cooling defects. So far, the system has been used successfully up to the MEBT. It will be tested soon for the super conducting Linac consisting of 4 cryomodules and 27 cavities. This Machine Protection System relies on three sets: the MRF timing system that is the messenger of the "shut beam" messages coming from any devices, IOxOS MTCA boards with custom FPGA developments that monitor the Section Beam Current Transmission along the accelerator and a Beam Destination Master that manages the beam destination required. This Destination Master is based on a master PLC. It permanently monitors Siemens PLCs that are in charge of the "slow" detection for fields such as vacuum, cryogenic and cooling system. The paper describes the architecture of this protection system and the exchanges between these three main parts.
	Poster THPDP102 [2.104 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-THPDP102
About •	Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 10 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 06 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

Paper

Title

Other Keywords

Page

TU2BCO06

Verification and Validation of the ESS Machine Protection System-of-Systems (MP-SoS)

hardware, operation, interface, software

296

A. Nordt, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, J. Gustafsson, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, G.L. Ljungquist, S. Pavinato, A. Petrushenko
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source, ESS, is a source of spallation neutrons used for neutron scattering experiments, complementary to synchrotron light sources. ESS has very ambitious goals and experimentation with neutrons at ESS should be one or two orders of magnitude more performing compared to other sources. Each proton beam pulse generated by the linear accelerator will have a peak power of 125 MW. The machine’s equipment must be protected from damage due to beam losses, as such losses could lead to melting of e.g. the beam pipe within less than 5 microseconds. System-of-Systems engineering has been applied to deploy systematic and robust protection of the ESS machine. The ESS Machine Protection System of Systems (MP-SoS) consists of large-scale distributed systems, of which the components themselves are complex systems. Testing, verification and validation of the MP-SoS is rather challenging as each constituent system of the MP-SoS has its own management, functionality that is not necessarily designed for protection, and also the different system owners follow their own verification strategies. In this paper, we will present our experience gained through the first 3 beam commissioning phases, ESS has gone through so far. We will describe how we managed to declare MP-SoS to being ready for beam operation without complexifying the task, and we will present the challenges, issues, and lessons learned faced during the verification and validation campaigns.

Slides TU2BCO06 [1.930 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO06

About •

Received ※ 31 October 2023 — Revised ※ 03 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 12 December 2023 — Issued ※ 20 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TUPDP078

Management of Configuration for Protection Systems at ESS

controls, interface, operation, PLC

695

M. Carroll, G.L. Ljungquist, M. Mansouri, A. Nordt, D. Paulic
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source (ESS) in Sweden is one of the largest science and technology infrastructure projects being built today. The facility design and construction include the most powerful linear proton accelerator ever built, a five-tonne, helium-cooled tungsten target wheel and 22 state-of-the-art neutron instruments. The Protection Systems Group (PSG) at ESS are responsible for the delivery and management of all the Personnel Safety Systems (PSS) and Machine Protection Systems (MPS), consisting of up to 30 PSS control systems and 6 machine protection systems. Due to the bespoke and evolving nature of the facility, managing the configuration of all these systems poses a significant challenge for the team. This paper will describe the methodology followed to ensure that the correct configuration is correctly implemented and maintained throughout the full engineering lifecycle for these systems.

Poster TUPDP078 [1.216 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP078

About •

Received ※ 06 October 2023 — Revised ※ 09 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 13 October 2023 — Issued ※ 26 October 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TUPDP129

The LCLS-II Experiment Controls Preemptive Machine Protection System

PLC, controls, interface, diagnostics

886

T.A. Wallace
SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA

Funding: This work is supported by Department of Energy contract DE-AC02-76SF00515.
The LCLS-II Preemptive Machine Protection System (PMPS) safeguards diagnostics, optics, beam-shaping components and experiment apparatus from damage by excess XFEL average power and single-shots. The dynamic nature of these systems requires a somewhat novel approach to a machine protection system design, relying more heavily on preemptive interlocks and automation to avoid mismatches between device states and beam parameters. This is in contrast to reactive machine protection systems. Safe beam parameter sets are determined from the combination of all integrated devices using a hierarchical arrangement and all state changes are held until beam conditions are assured to be safe. This machine protection system design utilizes the Beckhoff industrial controls platform and EtherCAT, and is woven into the LCLS subsystem controllers as a code library and standardized hardware interface.

Poster TUPDP129 [1.146 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TUPDP129

About •

Received ※ 25 October 2023 — Revised ※ 01 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 30 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

THPDP102

Machine Protection System at SARAF

PLC, controls, detector, hardware

1573

A. Gaget, J. Dumas
CEA-IRFU, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
A. Chancé, F. Gougnaud, T.J. Joannem, A. Lotode, S. Monnereau, V. Nadot
CEA-DRF-IRFU, France
H. Isakov, A. Perry, E. Reinfeld, I. Shmuely, N. Tamim, L. Weissman
Soreq NRC, Yavne, Israel

CEA Saclay Irfu is in charge of the major part of the control system of the SARAF-LINAC accelerator based at Soreq in Israel. This scope also includes the Machine Protection System. This system prevents any damage in the accelerator by shutting down the beam in case of detection of risky incidents like interceptive diagnostics in the beam or vacuum or cooling defects. So far, the system has been used successfully up to the MEBT. It will be tested soon for the super conducting Linac consisting of 4 cryomodules and 27 cavities. This Machine Protection System relies on three sets: the MRF timing system that is the messenger of the "shut beam" messages coming from any devices, IOxOS MTCA boards with custom FPGA developments that monitor the Section Beam Current Transmission along the accelerator and a Beam Destination Master that manages the beam destination required. This Destination Master is based on a master PLC. It permanently monitors Siemens PLCs that are in charge of the "slow" detection for fields such as vacuum, cryogenic and cooling system. The paper describes the architecture of this protection system and the exchanges between these three main parts.

Poster THPDP102 [2.104 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-THPDP102

About •

Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 10 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 06 December 2023 — Issued ※ 18 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)