ICALEPCS2023 - Table of Session: TU2BC (Functional Safety/Protection Systems/Cyber Security)

Paper	Title	Page
TU2BCO01	Database’s Disaster Recovery Meets a Ransomware Attack	280
	M.A. Zambrano SKAO, Macclesfield, United Kingdom V. Gonzalez ALMA Observatory, Santiago, Chile
	Cyberattacks are a growing threat to organizations around the world, including observatories. These attacks can cause significant disruption to operations and can be costly to recover from. This paper provides an overview of the history of cyberattacks, the motivations of attackers, and the organization of cybercrime groups. It also discusses the steps that can be taken to quickly restore a key component of any organization, the database, and the lessons learned during the recovery process. The paper concludes by identifying some areas for improvement in cybersecurity, such as the need for better training for employees, more secure networks, and more robust data backup and recovery procedures.
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO01
About •	Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 11 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 16 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO02	Protection Layers Design for the High Luminosity LHC Full Remote Alignment System	285
	B. Fernández Adiego, E. Blanco Vinuelapresenter, A. Germinario, H. Mainaud Durand, M. Sosin CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland
	The Full Remote Alignment System (FRAS) is a complex measurement, alignment and control system designed to remotely align components of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) following its High Luminosity upgrade. The purpose of FRAS is to guarantee optimal alignment of the strong focusing magnets and associated components near the experimental interaction points, while at the same time limiting the radiation dose to which surveyors in the LHC tunnel are subjected. A failure in the FRAS control system, or an operator mistake, could provoke a non desired displacement of a component that could lead to damage of neighbouring equipment. Such an incident would incur a considerable repair cost both in terms of money and time. To mitigate this possibility, an exhaustive risk analysis of FRAS has been performed, with the design of protection layers according to the IEC 61511 standard proposed. This paper presents the different functional safety techniques applied to FRAS, reports on the current project status, and introduces the future activities to complete the safety life cycle.
	Slides TU2BCO02 [2.757 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO02
About •	Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 19 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO04	Accelerator Systems Cyber Security Activities at SLAC	292
	G.R. White, A.L. Edelen SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA
	Funding: Work supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract number DE-AC02-76SF00515. We describe four cyber security related activities of SLAC and collaborations. First, from a broad review of accelerator computing cyber and mission reliability, our analysis method, findings and outcomes. Second, lab-wide and accelerator penetration testing, in particular methods to control, coordinate, and trap, potentially hazardous scans. Third, a summary gap analysis of recent US regulatory orders from common practice at accelerators, and our plans to address these in collaboration with the US Dept. of Energy. Finally, summary attack vectors of EPICS, and technical plans to add authentication and encryption to EPICS itself.
	Slides TU2BCO04 [1.677 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO04
About •	Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 13 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 15 November 2023 — Issued ※ 17 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO06	Verification and Validation of the ESS Machine Protection System-of-Systems (MP-SoS)	296
	A. Nordt, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, J. Gustafsson, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, G.L. Ljungquist, S. Pavinato, A. Petrushenko ESS, Lund, Sweden
	The European Spallation Source, ESS, is a source of spallation neutrons used for neutron scattering experiments, complementary to synchrotron light sources. ESS has very ambitious goals and experimentation with neutrons at ESS should be one or two orders of magnitude more performing compared to other sources. Each proton beam pulse generated by the linear accelerator will have a peak power of 125 MW. The machine’s equipment must be protected from damage due to beam losses, as such losses could lead to melting of e.g. the beam pipe within less than 5 microseconds. System-of-Systems engineering has been applied to deploy systematic and robust protection of the ESS machine. The ESS Machine Protection System of Systems (MP-SoS) consists of large-scale distributed systems, of which the components themselves are complex systems. Testing, verification and validation of the MP-SoS is rather challenging as each constituent system of the MP-SoS has its own management, functionality that is not necessarily designed for protection, and also the different system owners follow their own verification strategies. In this paper, we will present our experience gained through the first 3 beam commissioning phases, ESS has gone through so far. We will describe how we managed to declare MP-SoS to being ready for beam operation without complexifying the task, and we will present the challenges, issues, and lessons learned faced during the verification and validation campaigns.
	Slides TU2BCO06 [1.930 MB]
DOI •	reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO06
About •	Received ※ 31 October 2023 — Revised ※ 03 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 12 December 2023 — Issued ※ 20 December 2023
Cite •	reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

Paper

Title

Page

Database’s Disaster Recovery Meets a Ransomware Attack

280

M.A. Zambrano
SKAO, Macclesfield, United Kingdom
V. Gonzalez
ALMA Observatory, Santiago, Chile

Cyberattacks are a growing threat to organizations around the world, including observatories. These attacks can cause significant disruption to operations and can be costly to recover from. This paper provides an overview of the history of cyberattacks, the motivations of attackers, and the organization of cybercrime groups. It also discusses the steps that can be taken to quickly restore a key component of any organization, the database, and the lessons learned during the recovery process. The paper concludes by identifying some areas for improvement in cybersecurity, such as the need for better training for employees, more secure networks, and more robust data backup and recovery procedures.

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO01

About •

Received ※ 05 October 2023 — Revised ※ 11 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 16 November 2023 — Issued ※ 16 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO02

Protection Layers Design for the High Luminosity LHC Full Remote Alignment System

285

B. Fernández Adiego, E. Blanco Vinuelapresenter, A. Germinario, H. Mainaud Durand, M. Sosin
CERN, Meyrin, Switzerland

The Full Remote Alignment System (FRAS) is a complex measurement, alignment and control system designed to remotely align components of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) following its High Luminosity upgrade. The purpose of FRAS is to guarantee optimal alignment of the strong focusing magnets and associated components near the experimental interaction points, while at the same time limiting the radiation dose to which surveyors in the LHC tunnel are subjected. A failure in the FRAS control system, or an operator mistake, could provoke a non desired displacement of a component that could lead to damage of neighbouring equipment. Such an incident would incur a considerable repair cost both in terms of money and time. To mitigate this possibility, an exhaustive risk analysis of FRAS has been performed, with the design of protection layers according to the IEC 61511 standard proposed. This paper presents the different functional safety techniques applied to FRAS, reports on the current project status, and introduces the future activities to complete the safety life cycle.

Slides TU2BCO02 [2.757 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO02

About •

Received ※ 03 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 14 December 2023 — Issued ※ 19 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO04

Accelerator Systems Cyber Security Activities at SLAC

292

G.R. White, A.L. Edelen
SLAC, Menlo Park, California, USA

Funding: Work supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract number DE-AC02-76SF00515.
We describe four cyber security related activities of SLAC and collaborations. First, from a broad review of accelerator computing cyber and mission reliability, our analysis method, findings and outcomes. Second, lab-wide and accelerator penetration testing, in particular methods to control, coordinate, and trap, potentially hazardous scans. Third, a summary gap analysis of recent US regulatory orders from common practice at accelerators, and our plans to address these in collaboration with the US Dept. of Energy. Finally, summary attack vectors of EPICS, and technical plans to add authentication and encryption to EPICS itself.

Slides TU2BCO04 [1.677 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO04

About •

Received ※ 04 October 2023 — Revised ※ 13 October 2023 — Accepted ※ 15 November 2023 — Issued ※ 17 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)

TU2BCO06

Verification and Validation of the ESS Machine Protection System-of-Systems (MP-SoS)

296

A. Nordt, M. Carroll, S. Gabourin, J. Gustafsson, S. Kövecses de Carvalho, G.L. Ljungquist, S. Pavinato, A. Petrushenko
ESS, Lund, Sweden

The European Spallation Source, ESS, is a source of spallation neutrons used for neutron scattering experiments, complementary to synchrotron light sources. ESS has very ambitious goals and experimentation with neutrons at ESS should be one or two orders of magnitude more performing compared to other sources. Each proton beam pulse generated by the linear accelerator will have a peak power of 125 MW. The machine’s equipment must be protected from damage due to beam losses, as such losses could lead to melting of e.g. the beam pipe within less than 5 microseconds. System-of-Systems engineering has been applied to deploy systematic and robust protection of the ESS machine. The ESS Machine Protection System of Systems (MP-SoS) consists of large-scale distributed systems, of which the components themselves are complex systems. Testing, verification and validation of the MP-SoS is rather challenging as each constituent system of the MP-SoS has its own management, functionality that is not necessarily designed for protection, and also the different system owners follow their own verification strategies. In this paper, we will present our experience gained through the first 3 beam commissioning phases, ESS has gone through so far. We will describe how we managed to declare MP-SoS to being ready for beam operation without complexifying the task, and we will present the challenges, issues, and lessons learned faced during the verification and validation campaigns.

Slides TU2BCO06 [1.930 MB]

DOI •

reference for this paper ※ doi:10.18429/JACoW-ICALEPCS2023-TU2BCO06

About •

Received ※ 31 October 2023 — Revised ※ 03 November 2023 — Accepted ※ 12 December 2023 — Issued ※ 20 December 2023

Cite •

reference for this paper using ※ BibTeX, ※ LaTeX, ※ Text/Word, ※ RIS, ※ EndNote (xml)